5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory 2012
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 SAGT 2012 - Program

SAGT 2012 Program

All sessions will take place in the Sala d'Actes of the Barcelona School of Informatics
located in the ground floor of the B-6 Bulding, UPC North Campus

October 22

  • 09:00 to 09:50 Registration
  • 09:50 to 11:00 Session 1
    • Openning
    • Marios Mavronicolas and Burkhard Monien. Minimizing Expectation Plus Variance.
    • Krzysztof R. Apt and Guido Schaefer. Selfishness Level of Strategic Games.
  • 11:00 to 11:30 Coffee Break
  • 11:30 to 13:00 Session 2
    • Tom Ron and Michal Feldman. Capacitated Network Design Games.
    • Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas and Paul Spirakis. On the Hardness of Network Design for Bottleneck Routing Games.
    • Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Martina Hüllmann, Peter Kling and Alexander Setzer. Basic Network Creation Games with Communication Interests.
  • 13:00 to 14:30 Lunch
  • 14:30 to 16:00 Session 3
    • Vahab Mirrokni, Nithum Thain and Adrian Vetta. A Theoretical Examination of Practical Game Playing: Lookahead Search.
    • Diodato Ferraioli, Paul Goldberg and Carmine Ventre. Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games.
    • Jochen Koenemann, Kate Larson and David Steiner. Network Bargaining: Using Approximate Blocking Sets to Stabilize  Unstable Instances.
  • 16:00 to 16:30 Coffee Break
  • 16:30 to 18:30 Session 4
    • Antony McCabe and Paul Goldberg. Commodity Auctions and Frugality Ratios.
    • Evangelos Markakis and Orestis Telelis. Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency.
    • Michal Feldman and John Lai. Mechanisms and impossibilities for truthful, envy-free allocations.
    • Hu Fu, Patrick Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Uri Nadav, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Sergei Vassilvitskii. Ad Auctions with Data.
  • 21:00 Conference dinner

October 23

  • 09:00 to 10:30 Session 5
    • Vincenzo Auletta, George Christodoulou and Paolo Penna. Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values.
    • Sylvain Béal, Eric Remila and Philippe Solal. An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games.
    • Nuh Aygun Dalkiran, Moshe Hoffman, Ramamohan Paturi, Daniel Ricketts and Andrea Vattani. Common Knowledge and State-dependent Equilibria.
  • 10:30 to 11:00 Coffee Break
  • 11:00 to 13:00 Session 6
    • Krzysztof Apt and Sunil Easaw Simon. A Classification of Weakly Acyclic Games.
    • Mees de Vries and Ruben Brokkelkamp. Convergence of Ordered Improvement Paths in Generalized Congestion Games.
    • Laurent Gourves, Jerome Monnot, Stefano Moretti and Thang Nguyen. Congestion games with capacitated resources.
    • Vittorio Biló and Marios Mavronicolas. The Complexity of Decision Problems about Nash Equilibria in Win-Lose Games.
  • 13:00 to 14:30 Lunch
  • 14:30 to 16:00 Session 7
    • Paul Goldberg and Arnoud Pastink. On the Communication Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria
    • Kord Eickmeyer, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen and Elad Verbin. Approximating the minmax value of 3-player games within a constant is as hard as detecting planted cliques.
    • John Fearnley, Paul Goldberg, Rahul Savani and Troels Sørensen. Approximate Well-supported Nash Equilibria Below Two-thirds.
  • 16:00 Closing